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SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO
INQUIRE INTO JURORS' RACIAL
PREJUDICES
Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment guarantees the "right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury."' This right has been vigorously
scrutinized in criminal proceedings involving the death penalty2 and
in situations where the defendant and the victim are of different
races.3 The Supreme Court recently examined these issues in Turner
v. Murray4 and held that a black defendant accused of murdering a
white store owner was entitled to have prospective jurors questioned during the voir dire as to their possible racial biases. 5 The
6
Turner Court ultimately vacated the defendant's death sentence
7
while upholding the jury's finding of guilt.
This note analyzes earlier cases involving the establishment of
voir dire standards in both capital and non-capital trials of interracial
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 ChiefJustice Hughes wrote in 1931 that the "risk [of a racially biased jury] becomes most grave when the issue is of life or death." Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308, 314 (1931).
3 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held
that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court used data
reflecting the disproportionate application of the death penalty to minorities as support.
Id. at 250 n.15, 364. Many works have also addressed the fact that black capital defendants receive the death penalty with disproportionately higher frequency than white capital defendants. See Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983)(analyzing inconsistent application of death penalty to white defendants and black defendants in South
Carolina); Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS
119 (1973)(analyzing significant effect of racial discrimination in application of the death
penalty); Note, CapitalPunishment in Virginia, 58 VA. L. REV. 97 (1972)(in-depth examination of application of death penalty in 19th and 20th Century Virginia).
4 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
5 Id. at 1688. The Supreme Court recently stated that "without an adequate voir dire
the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled."
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
6 Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1688.
7 Id. at 1689.
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crimes s the facts and the Supreme Court opinions in Turner,9 and
the effects of Turner on voir dire inquiries into the existing racial biases of jurors in future trials involving interracial crimes. 10
II.

BACKGROUND:

ORIGINS OF VOIR DIRE INQUIRY INTO RACIAL

PREJUDICES IN INTERRACIAL CRIMES

An analysis of the voir dire criteria used in both interracial capital and non-capital criminal proceedings must begin with the
Supreme Court's 1931 decision in Aldridge v. United States." The
trial judge in Aldridge disallowed the defense counsel's request to
inquire into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors which
might arise because the defendant was black and the homicide victim was white. 12 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
3
affirmation of the defendant's conviction and death sentence.'
Chief Justice Hughes, writing the majority opinion, acknowledged
that cries of overprotection of black defendants would arise from
the Court's decision to allow the questioning of jurors as to their
racial prejudice. 14 He presented the following justifications for the
Court's decision:
If in fact, sharing the general sentiment, [the jurors] were found to be
impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question; but if
any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be perpetrated in allowing him to sit. Despite the privileges accorded to the
negro, we do not think that it can be said that the possibility of such
prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry.
And this risk becomes most grave when the issue is of life or death. 15
ChiefJustice Hughes' rationalization has subsequently been cited in
6
numerous opinions.'
8
9
10
11
12

See infra notes 11-128 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-224 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
283 U.S. 308.
Id. at 311. The victim was a member of the District of Columbia police force. Id.

at 309.
13 283 U.S. 308, rev k 47 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
14 Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314.
15 Id. (footnote omitted).
16 See infra notes 46, 73, 104, 125-28, and 202 and accompanying text.
In the 1966 case of King v. United States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the D.C.
Circuit, which was reversed in Aldridge, found that Aldridge "is not limited to capital
crimes or even to crimes of violence." Id. at 969. The black defendants in King were
accused of assaulting a white person. At trial the judge refused to permit the defense to
ask the prospective jurors if they would be biased by the interracial nature of the alleged
offense. Id. In making his ruling, the trial judge replied:
We do not draw any color line in this courtroom. Now if you are going to start
drawing the color line, before we swear the jury-of course once jeopardy com-
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The Aldridge dissent, written by Justice McReynolds, addressed
the overprotectionist arguments forecasted by Chief Justice
Hughes. 17 Justice McReynolds rejected the majority's argument
that black defendants could receive less equal treatment than their
white counterparts in stating that
in a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, where the colored race is
accorded all the privileges and rights under the law, that are afforded
the white race, and especially the right to practice in the courts, serve
on the jury, etc., we are of the opinion that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to permit the question to be answered by thejurors.'a
mences I cannot do anything about it-but I am going to continue the case and have
other counsel appointed if you gentlemen intend to make a color issue here. You
know, I believe in equal rights but I do not believe in preferential rights.
Id. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the defendant's subsequent conviction in light
of Aldridge. Id.
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971), applied
Aldridge to a non-capital case involving a black man accused of bank robbery. At trial, the
judge disallowed defense counsel's attempt to explicitly inquire into the potential racial
prejudices of thejurors. Id. at 1133. The Sixth Circuit held that this refusal constituted
reversible error since "anything but a direct inquiry as to the presence of racial prejudice will fail to satisfy the essential demands of fairness necessary to ascertain whether or
not ajuror has a conscious or unconscious prejudice against a defendant because of his
race or color." Id. at 1134-35. Herein, the court disregarded the prosecution's arguments that the record was void of evidence of a racially prejudiced jury panel. Id. at
1134.
The South Carolina Supreme Court narrowly defined the extent of the Aldridge
holding in State v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E.2d 686 (1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 300
(1961). The Brooks defendant, a black man, was accused of raping a white woman in
Greenville, South Carolina. Id. at 346-48, 111 S.E.2d at 688. At trial, the defense counsel requested the inclusion of several questions during voir dire. Id. at 349, 111 S.E.2d at
689. The judge allowed a general inquiry into the potential racial biases of the jurors.
Id., I ll S.E.2d at 689. The accepted question asked: "Would you have any prejudice
against a defendant because of his color?" Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The judge, however,
disallowed explicit questioning about further prejudices arising from the fact that the
crime charged was interracial rape. Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The refused question was:
"Would it take less evidence for you to render a verdict against a colored person
charged with rape or assault with intent to ravish a white female than it would for you to
render a verdict against a white person charged with rape or assault with intent to ravish
a colored female?" Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the trial court's refusal to allow the more specific question to be asked during voir dire
was not an error for two reasons. First, the disallowed question was sufficiently included
in the scope of the permitted inquiry into the potential racial prejudices of the jurors
arising from the defendant's race. Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. Second, the court stated that
"such examination ofjurors, its nature and extent, are within the discretion of the trial
judge." Id., 111 S.E.2d at 689. Brooks, therefore, reflected the South Carolina Supreme
Court's unwillingness to extend Aldridge to include mandatory inquiry into the particular
racial biases ofjurors which may arise from a crime such as interracial rape. See infra text
accompanying notes 71-73 forJustice Marshall's arguments about the unique nature of
interracial rape in his dissent from the 1976 certiorari denial of Dukes v. Waitkevitch,
536 F.2d 469 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976).
17 Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 315-18 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 316 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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Justice McReynolds argued that there was no evidence in the Aldridge trial record that prejudice affected any juror's decision.1 9 In
fact, it was "not even argued that considering the evidence
20
presented there was room for reasonable doubt of guilt."
The United States Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of voir dire inquiry into the racial prejudices of prospective jurors in the 1973 decision of Ham v. South Carolina.2 1 The defendant
in Ham was a black man accused of a non-capital, non-violent offense. Ham's trial, arising from a charge of marijuana possession in
South Carolina, was seemingly aggravated by the fact that he was a
well-known civil rights activist. 2 2 In an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court cited the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 2 3 and reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's
holding that voir dire queries into racial prejudices were not required
24
even if timely requested.
The Ham Court, however, upheld the trial judge's denial of defense counsel's requested inquiry into the prospective jurors'
prejudices against facial hair. 25 The Court cited Aldridge as representing "the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial
judge in conducting voir dire" 26 in support of its denial of the facial
19 Id. at 317 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). See infra note 220 for Justice Powell's
statement in his Turner dissent that the trial record was absent of detrimental racial
biases.
20 Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 317 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit embraced Justice McReynolds' argument approximately forty years later in United States v.
Grant, 494 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974). The defendant in Grant
was a black postal worker accused of stealing articles from the mail service. 494 F.2d at
121. Soon after her arrest, the defendant confessed to taking the items in question.
During voir dire, the trial judge did not allow defense counsel to inquire into the possible
racial biases of the prospective jurors. Id. In affirming the resulting conviction, the Second Circuit stated that "in view of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt, the
error here, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 122.
21 409 U.S. 524 (1973). Two of the voir dire inquiries proposed by the defense counsel related to possible racial prejudice against the defendant. The third request inquired
into potential biases against men, like the defendant, who have beards. The fourth request inquired into potential biases arising from pretrial publicity. The trial judge denied all four requests. Id. at 525-26.
22 Id. at 524-25.
23 Id. at 527. The Court stated that
South Carolina law permits challenges for cause, and authorizes the trial judge to
conduct voir dire examination of potential jurors. The State having created this statutory framework for the selection of juries, the essential fairness required by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that under the facts
shown by this record the petitioner be permitted to have the jurors interrogated on
the issue of racial bias.
Id.
24 Id. at 529.
25 Id. at 527-28.
26 Id. at 528.
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2
hair inquiry.
Justices Douglas and Marshall partially concurred and partially

dissented in Ham.2 8 Both Justices concurred with the majority's

holding that lack of inquiry into the potential racial biases of the
prospective jurors constituted reversible error. 29 Justices Douglas
and Marshall disagreed, however, with the majority's opinion that
inquiry into juror prejudice arising from the defendant's hair-length
was unnecessary. Justice Marshall acknowledged that hair length
was a basis for unfair juror prejudice and stated:
It makes little difference to a criminal defendant whether the jury has
prejudged him because of the color of his skin or because of the length
of his hair. In either event, he has been deprived of the right to present his case to neutral and detached observers capable of rendering a
fair and impartial verdict.3 0
Justice Marshall argued further that limitations on initial voir dire inquiries into juror bias may greatly prejudice counsel's effective use
of challenges for cause. 3 1
A major departure from Ham occurred in the Court's 1976 decision in Ristaino v. Ross. 32

Ross was one of several blacks convicted

of attacking a white security guard in Boston.3 3 The trial judge denied the defense counsel's request to inquire into the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors, and Ross was convicted by a
27 Id. The Court stated that
[g]iven the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting
voir dire, Aldridge v. United States, supra, and our inability to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar
prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated
when the trial judge refused to put this question.
Id.
28

Id. at 529-34.

Id. at 529 (Douglas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and 530-31 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 Id. at 531-32 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 Id. at 532 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In the 1964 case of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1964), the Supreme
Court acknowledged the crucial role of counsel's voir dire examination and its effects on
later trial strategy. The Court stated: "The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, and the
process of selecting a jury protracted." Id. (footnote omitted). In Rosales-Lopez v.
United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981), the Supreme Court stated that "lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges .. " See
infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rosaes-Lopez.
29

32

388 F. Supp. 99 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1974), rev'd 424 U.S.

589 (1976).
33 "Petitioner was convicted in state court of armed robbery, assault and battery by
means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to murder." Ross v.
Massachusetts, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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jury in Ross v. Massachusetts.3 4 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the Supreme Judicial Court's affirmation3 5 and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Ham v. South
36
Carolina."
On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld its prior ruling.3 7 The court analyzed the Ham decision and
distinguished its facts from those of Ross v. Massachusetts.3 8 Ham, according to the court, did not mandate voir dire inquiry into possible
racial prejudices "in all State criminal trials when the defendant is
black (or from some other racial minority group), even when the
defendant has requested such an inquiry and the statutory framework permits questioning to discover bias." 3 9 Rather, the court
found voir dire inquiry necessary in Ham because Ham was a wellknown civil rights leader who "would have been a prominent target
for [juror] prejudice." 40 The court found that no similar heightened
expectation of racial prejudice existed for the Ross v. Massachusetts
41
defendant.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded its decision by announcing the standards to be used in future cases similar
to Ross v. Massachusetts. The court stated:
The issue of racial prejudice may not be apparent at the outset of a
case but may become evident during the trial. Therefore, when a defendant requests that the prospective jurors be questioned about their
racial prejudice, the judge should make specific inquiries of counsel
concerning the racial aspects of the case .... If it appears from such
preliminary inquiries that the case might reasonably be expected to
present factors involving possible racial prejudice,42 then the judge
should question the prospective jurors in this area.
34 The requested inquiry which was denied by the trial judge was: "Are there any of
you who believe that a white person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black
person?" Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. at 667 n.4, 296 N.E.2d at 812 n.4.
35 Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1972).
36 Ross v. Massachusetts, 410 U.S. 901, 901 (1973).
37 Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810.
38 Id. at 666-67, 671-74, 296 N.E.2d at 811-12, 815-16.
39 Id. at 671, 296 N.E.2d at 815.
40 Id. at 672, 296 N.E.2d at 815.
41 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 816.
42 Id. at 673, 296 N.E.2d at 816. In United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Floyd v. United States, 429 U.S. 852 (1976), the D.C. Circuit
closely followed the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Ross v.
Massachusetts. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for an analysis of the opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Ross v. Massachusetts. The Diggs
defendant was a black man convicted of participating in a Washington, D.C. bank robbery. He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including the inadequate inquiry
into the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors. 522 F.2d at 1317-18. The circuit court rejected this argument, stating that the defendant
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The United States Supreme Court denied Ross' second petition
for a writ of certiorari, 43 with Justice Marshall, who was joined by
Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissenting.4 4 Justice Marshall rejected the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's reading of Ham
as applying only to a fact situation similar to that of Ham.45 Rather,
argued Justice Marshall, Ham effectively affirmed the A1dridge Court's
46
commitment to rid the system of racially biased jurors.
Ross v. Massachusetts arose again as Ristaino v. Ross on a writ of

habeas corpus 4 7 soon after the Supreme Court's 1973 denial of certiorari. 48 Both the District Court of Massachusetts and the First Circuit granted the writ, relying on Ham.4 9 In 1976, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the decisions below and denied Ross' habeas corpus
writ. 50 In reversing, the Court stated that "[w]e think the Court of

Appeals read Ham too broadly." 5 1

The majority opinion in Ristaino, written by Justice Powell, repeatedly distinguished the facts of Ham in reaching the conclusion
that inquiry into the potential racial biases of prospective jurors is
necessary only in a limited number of cases. 5 2 Since Ham was a
had made no effort whatever to establish any such factual situation as can be noted
in Aldridge and Ham. Nothing was shown actually to cause the judge to inquire into
possible prejudice against Floyd because he was black. It would seem that some
development of a situation of that sort is essential ....
Id. at 1318. The Diggs dissent, written by District judge justice, rejected the majority's
attempt to distinguish Diggs from Aldridge and Ham. Id. at 1331-32 (Justice, J., dissenting). Judge Justice applied the reasoning from Aidridge and Ham in stating that
we should not require a showing that a criminal defendant is a "special target of
prejudice" before permitting his inquiry into jury bias. While the trial court should
be free to exercise its broad discretion over the form and numbers of questions to
be asked, it should not be permitted to preclude inquiry into racial bias when a
criminal defendant evidences a desire to satisfy himself in this regard.
Id. at 1332 (Justice, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
43 Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080.
44 Id. at 1080-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 1082 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 1083-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall stated:
That petitioner was tried in Boston, Massachusetts, while Gene Ham was tried in
Florence, South Carolina, is of no significance. Racial prejudice is a cultural malady
that has shaped our history as a nation. It is a cancer of the mind and spirit which
breeds as prolifically in the industrial cities of the North as in the rural towns of the
South. And where, as here and in the strikingly similar circumstances of the Aldridge
case, a Negro is being accused of an attack on a white policeman, it would be disingenuous at best to assert that he is not apt to be a particular target of racial
prejudice.
Id. at 1085 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
47 388 F. Supp. 99, affd, 508 F.2d 754, rev'd, 424 U.S. 589.
48 Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080.
49 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 594.
50 Id. at 598.
51 Id. at 594.
52 Id. at 596-98.
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black civil rights activist who claimed that he was framed by the local
police, 53 the Court concluded that "[r]acial issues... were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."' 54 The two specific
circumstances of Ham's occupation and his defense, therefore, necessitated voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice when requested in
Ham.55 The Court concluded that such circumstances suggested the
need for a special voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice more than did
the circumstances in Ristaino,5 6 as the latter "did not suggest a sig'5 7
nificant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial."
In addition to its strict factual adherence to Ham, the Court ardently
rejected the adoption of a per se inquiry into the racial prejudices of
prospective jurors in all criminal actions involving a defendant and a
58
victim of different races.
The Ristaino majority, however, conceded a major point in a
footnote. 59 After repeating the Ristaino holding, Justice Powell
noted that "the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate
questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the
defendant. Under our supervisory power we would have required
as much of a federal court faced with the circumstances here." 60
Therefore, if Ristaino had arisen in federal district court the
Supreme Court would have reached the opposite result.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Ristaino was succinct. After quoting
from his dissent in the Ross v. Massachusetts denial of certiorari, 61 the
Justice stated that the Ristaino majority opinion "emphatically confirms that the promises inherent in Ham and Aldridge will not be
53 Id. at 596-97.
54 Id. at 597.
55 Id. The Court stated that such voir dire questioning, when requested, was "necessary to meet the constitutional requirement that an impartial jury be impaneled." Id.
56 Id. at 597-98. The circumstances in Ristaino cited as important by the First Circuit
included the fact that the victim was white and the defendants were black and the fact
that the victim was a security guard. Id. at 597.

57 Id. at 598. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
Supreme Judicial Court's attempt to distinguish Ham in Ross v. Massachusetts.
58 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596 n.8. In its rejection of the use of a per se rule, the Court
used the following analysis:

We note that such a per se rule could not, in principle, be limited to cases involving
possible racial prejudice. It would apply with equal force whenever voir dire questioning about ethnic origins was sought, and its logic could encompass questions
concerning other factors, such as religious affiliation or national origin. In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against
the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn
upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.
Id.(citations omitted).
59 Id. at 597 n.9.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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62

filfilled."
Similar arguments arose in the United States Supreme Court's
1976 denial of certiorari in Dukes v. Waitkevitch.6 3 The Dukes defendant, who was black, was accused of interracial rape, armed robbery,
kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon. 64 The Dukes trial
judge refused to allow specific voir dire inquiry into the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors. 65 The state appellate court upheld the resulting conviction, and the defendant's appeal request
66
was, in turn, denied by the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court.
The federal district court subsequently granted the defendant's
habeas corpus writ, 6 7 and the First Circuit, which the Supreme
Court had recently reversed in Ristaino,68 reversed. 69 In its reversal,
the First Circuit rejected the defendant's attempts to distinguish the
interracial assault charge at issue in Ristaino from the interracial rape
70
charge at issue in Dukes.
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the Supreme
Court's subsequent denial of certiorari. 7 1 Justice Marshall, in distinguishing the facts of Ristaino from the facts of Dukes, discussed the
unique nature of a charge of interracial rape, "especially in a city
[Boston] where racial conflict is close to the surface .... "72 In its
certiorari denial, stated Justice Marshall, "the Court empties of
meaning the promise of Aldridge and of our recent decision in Ham v.
South Carolina ....
That promise is the fundamental guaranty of a
' 73
fair trial before an impartial jury.
Three circuit court cases arising after Ristaino and Dukes reflect
the great amount of discretion consistently granted the trial judge in
the voir dire process. The Eighth Circuit decided two cases in 1978
which appeared to establish the rule that post-Ristaino trial courts
have few limits on the amount of discretion exercised in the conduct
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
429 U.S. 932 (1976).
64 Dukes v. Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469, 469 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976).
65 536 F.2d at 469. Thejudge told the jurors the following: the crimes charged, the
fact that the accused was black and the victims were white, and that the race of either
party was not to be considered. Id. at 469-70.
66 Id. at 470.
67 Id.
68 See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text for an analysis of Ristaino.
69 Dukes, 536 F.2d at 471.
70 Id. at 470. The First Circuit stated that "while interracial rape may be a classic
catalyst of racial prejudice, the prejudice inheres in the identities of parties and victims
and not in the specific issues." Id. at 471.
71 Dukes, 429 U.S. at 932-33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 933 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
62
63
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of the voir dire. In United States v. Bell,7 4 the Eighth Circuit upheld the
trial court's conviction of a black defendant accused of illegally
transporting sawed-off shotguns. 75 The defendant challenged the
decision on the grounds that the trial court's refusal to allow specific
voir dire inquiries about race requested by the defendant constituted
reversible error. 76 The trial court included some questions concerning racial bias in the voir dire,77 and, according to the Eighth
Circuit, these inquiries satisfied the district court's "non-constitutional
duty to inquire as to possible racial bias on the jury panel when the
defendant is a member of a racial minority group." ' 7 8 The circuit
court referred to an earlier Supreme Court case in stating that "as in
Ristaino, the issue of race was not 'inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the [Bell] trial'.

. .

. Consequently, the district court was

under no constitutional obligation to probe prospective jurors for
79
signs of racism."
Two weeks after deciding Bell, the Eighth Circuit ruled on a second case involving the voir dire process in the trial of a black defendant. 80 In United States v. Bowles, the district court found the
defendant guilty of distributing the drug phencyclidine. 8 1 During
the voir dire, defense counsel requested inclusion of a question about
the effect of the defendant's race on thejurors' opinions.8 2 The trial
judge refused.83 The Eighth Circuit cited Bell 84 in support of the
74

573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).

75 Id. at 1041-46.
76 Id. at 1042.
77 The following questions were included in the voir dire:
Do any of you have any prejudices about giving a fair trial to a person of a minority
race? Have any of you had any untold experiences with black people, any experiences that would be unusual of any kind that might shade your thinking in a situation of this kind? Do any of you think that you might give more credibility to the
testimony of a witness who was white than to a witness who was black?
Id.
78 Id. at 1043 (emphasis in original).
79 Id. (quoting Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597)(emphasis in original)(citation omitted).
80 United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1978).
81 Id. at 971. Phencyclidine is more commonly referred to as "PGP" or "Angel
Dust." Id.
82 Id. at 972. No specific inquiry into the effects of racial bias on the jurors' decisionmaking was formulated by defense counsel. Id.
83 Id. The trial judge told defense counsel:
I am not going to ask that. I just feel that I-I may be unfair to you, but I feel that
would put undue emphasis on it. I have told them to weigh their own conscience
and I believe if they are racially prejudice[d] they ought to come forth and say it;
and if they are, they are not going to respond if I ask them. That is just the way I
feel about it. I understand your concern but I feel it is better for you.
Id.
84 573 F.2d 1040; see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text for an analysis of Bell.
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proposition that voir dire conduct is within the judge's discretion.8 5
Limits on this discretion exist, however, since "it by no means follows that where, as here, the defendant is a Negro, the district judge
may with impunity refuse to make appropriate inquiry of the jury
panel as to possible racial bias, and then justify such refusal by asserting the exercise of discretion." 86
In United States v. Williams,8 7 the Third Circuit reversed the district court's conviction of a black man for violating a federal law
prohibiting "convicted felons from receiving firearms shipped in interstate commerce." 8 8 The district court did not allow defense
counsel to inquire as to " 'whether br not the fact that the defendant
is black would in any way affect their [the jury panel's] judgment in
the case or cause some difficulty to return a fair verdict?' "89 The
Third Circuit relied on its 1973 decision in UnitedStates v. Robinson 90
to hold that Ristaino did not control. 9 ' Specifically, the Third Circuit
stated:
[I]n Ristaino, the constitutional propriety of a state criminal proceeding
was in question, and while the Court refused to rule that a voir dire
question similar to the one at issue here was constitutionally mandated, it nevertheless made it clear that had it been reviewing a federal
proceeding, in the exercise of its supervisory powers it would have required that9 2the racial-bias question be asked 'if requested by the
defendant.'
The Third Circuit held that the trial court erred in disallowing voir
dire inquiry into racial prejudice for two reasons. First, Williams, unlike Ristaino, arose in the federal court system.9 3 Second, Robinson
94
mandated a racial prejudice inquiry when requested at voir dire.
The United States Supreme Court partially clarified the ambiguities arising from Ristaino and its incongruity with Ham in the
1981 decision of Rosales-Lopez v. United States.9 5 As in Ham and Ristaino, Rosales-Lopez involved a non-capital charge. The defendant,
who was of Mexican descent, 9 6 was convicted of illegally transport85

Bowles, 574 F.2d at 972.

86 Id.

612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).

87
88
89

Id. at 736.

96

Id. at 184.

Id. The trial court during a motion for a new trial deemed relevant the fact that
three jurors and one prosecution witness were black. Id.
90 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973). See infra note 202 for an analysis of United States v.
Robinson.
91 Williams, 612 F.2d at 736-37.
92 Id. at 737 (quoting Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9)(emphasis in original).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 736-37.
95 451 U.S. 182.
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ing Mexican aliens into the United States. 97 At trial, the court denied the defense counsel's request to inquire into the possible racial
or ethnic prejudices of the prospective jurors. 98
On appeal, the Supreme Court analyzed the doctrines emerging from Ristaino and Ham and applied them to the facts of RosalesLopez. 99 The Court distinguished Ham from Ristaino, arguing that
issues of racial prejudice were inseparable from Ham's trial
alone.1 00 Therefore, only in Ham was it reversible error for the trial
court to fail to examine the prospective jurors about potential racial
biases. 10 When a case contains racial issues which are separable
from the trial, as in Ristaino, then it is within the trial court's discre02
tion to decide whether to require an inquiry into racial prejudice. 1
The Court, however, acknowledged the major concession made in
footnote nine of Ristaino by stating that "[i]n the federal court system, we have indicated that under our supervisory authority over
the federal courts, we would require that questions directed to the
in
discovery of racial prejudice be asked in certain circumstances
03
mandated."'
constitutionally
which such inquiry is not
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court rejected the
use of the cost-benefit approach to racial bias voir dire inquiry used
by ChiefJustice Hughes in Aldridge.1 0 4 ChiefJustice Hughes argued
that the benefits of a more highly scrutinized jury panel far outweighed the potential costs of a longer voir dire process. 0 5 After
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185. The denied voir dire inquiries were: "Would you consider the race or
Mexican descent of Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case? How
would it affect you?" Id. Instead, the trial judge asked the prospective jurors more general questions about bias during the voir dire. Id. at 186-87. He stated at the beginning
of the voir dire:
In order that this defendant shall have a fair and impartial jury to try the charges
against him, it is necessary that we address certain questions to the panel to make
sure that there are no underlying prejudices, there are no underlying reasons why
you can't sit as a fair and impartial juror if chosen to do so in this case.
Id. at 186. The other questions asked by the judge included: "Do any of you have any
feelings about the alien problem at all?"; "Do any of you have any particular feeling one
way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial juror if you are
called upon to do so?"; "Does any reason occur to you why you could not sit in this case
as a fair and impartial juror, any reason whatsoever?" Id.
99 Id. at 189-92.
97
98

100 Id. at 189.

101 Id.
102 Id. at 190.
103 Id. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for an analysis of this concession
made by the Ristaino majority.
104 See supra note 15 and accompanying text for an analysis of this approach used by
Chief Justice Hughes in Aldridge.
105 Id.
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discussing this approach, the Court said that the major concern
should be "the appearance ofjustice in the federal courts." 10 6 The
Court stated further that voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice does
not need to be granted "where there is no rational possibilty of racial prejudice. But since the courts are seeking to assure the appearance and reality of a fair trial, if the defendant claims a meaningful
ethnic difference between himself and the victim, his voir dire request
10 7
should ordinarily be satisfied."
In Rosaes-Lopez, the Supreme Court also analyzed rulings ot
various circuit courts. 108 The Court acknowledged a split between
the circuit courts, with some courts adopting a per se rule' 0 9 -"requiring reversal whenever the trial judge fails to ask a question on
racial or ethnic prejudice requested by a defendant who is a member
of a minority group" I°0-and other courts rejecting a per se rulewherein "a trial judge is required to pose such a question only
where there is some indication that the particular case is likely to
have racial overtones or involve racial prejudice."'II
The Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez expressly rejected the per se
rule in favor of a three-part standard implied from its earlier holdings in Aldridge and Ristaino.112 The Court contended that inquiry
into the possible prejudices of the prospective jurors is necessary: 1)
"when requested by a defendant";"13 2) when the defendant has
been accused of a violent crime; and 3) when "the defendant and
1 4
the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups."
106
107
108
109

Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190.
Id. at 191 n.7.
Id. at 187-88.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text for the Court's opinion of the per se rule
in Ristaino.
110 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 187. In the opinion of the Rosales-Lopez majority, theper
se circuits are the Eighth, Third, Sixth, Fourth, and First Circuits. Id. at 187. Rulings
reflecting the application oftheperse rule include: United States v. Bowles, 574 F.2d 970
(8th Cir. 1978)(see supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text for an analysis of Bowles);
United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973)(see infa note 202 for an analysis of Robinson); United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971)(seesupra note 16
for an analysis of Carter); United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970); Frasier v.
United States, 267 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1959).
111 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 187-88. In the opinion of the Rosales-Lopez majority, the
non-per se circuits are the Tenth and Ninth Circuits. Rulings reflecting the rejection of
the per se rule include: United States v. Polk, 550 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 838 (1977), and United States v. Perez-Martinez, 525 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979)(see infra note 219 and accompanying text for an analysis of Barnes).
112 Rosaes-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190, 192.
113 Id. at 192.
114 Id. The Court stated further:
There may be other circumstances which suggest the need for such an inquiry, but
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In affirming the trial court's denial of voir dire inquiry into the
racial or ethnic prejudices of the prospective jurors, the Rosales-Lopez
Court focused on the fact that the defendant had never "argued that
the matters at issue in his trial involved allegations of racial or ethnic
prejudice ....
The Court applied two parts of its espoused
three-part standard 1 6 in pointing out that the alleged offense in
Rosales-Lopez was not violent and did not involve a perpetrator and a
7
victim of different races or ethnic groups.'"
Justice Rehnquist, joined by ChiefJustice Burger, concurred." 18
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the majority's three-part standard "as
creating a per se rule requiring reversal of any criminal conviction
involving a violent crime' between members of different racial or
ethnic groups if the district court refused to voir dire on the issue of
racial prejudice." 1 9 Justice Rehnquist was most disturbed by the
Court's use of ambiguous terms such as "violent crime" and "different racial or ethnic groups."' 120 Justice Rehnquist also stated that he
would give more discretion to the trial court in determining the ap12 1
propriateness of voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice.
Justice Rehnquist concluded his opinion by implying that in122
creases in judicial discretion may lead to more equitable results.
"115

the decision as to whether the total circumstances suggest a reasonable possibility
that racial or ethnic prejudice will affect the jury remains primarily with the trial
court, subject to case-by-case review by the appellate courts.
Id.
The Court fashioned a different standard in response to the question of when racial
prejudice inquiries at voir dire should be required in cases involving non-violent crimes
perpetrated by defendants on victims of the same racial or ethnic group. Using for support the denial of such inquiries in Ristaino, which involved a violent crime, the Court
stated that "[o]nly when there are more substantial indications of the likelihood of racial
or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial court's denial of
a defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to deal impartially with this subject
amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion." Id. at 190. The Court further explained this standard in stating that the defendant should make
the determination of whether or not he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial
or ethnic prejudice pursued. Failure to honor his request, however, will be reversible error only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury.
Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
115 Id. at 192. The Court in this statement seems to ignore the distinction between
the existence of racial or ethnic prejudice during the commission of a crime and the
presence of such prejudice during a trial.
116 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text for an explanation of this three-part
standard.
117 Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192.
118 Id. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 194 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
122 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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He stated that "[i]t seems to me quite conceivable that a thoroughly
competent and fairminded district court judge could conclude that
the asking of such questions, or the devotion of a substantial
amount of time to the inquiry, could well exacerbate whatever prejudice might exist without substantially aiding in exposing it."123Justice Stevens dissented in Rosales-Lopez and was joined byJustices Brennan and Marshall. 12 4 Following his rejection of the "special circumstances" approach used by the majority, Justice Stevens
discussed the applicability of Aldridge.125 Justice Stevens argued that
the Aldridge result was strengthened by the fact that it was supported
by decisions in state cases which arose prior to Aldridge.126 Furthermore, Aldridge expressly applied to all races and ethnic groups, not
just blacks. 127 As Justice Stevens noted, the Aldridge Court held that
" '[t]he right to examine jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of
a disqualifying state of mind, has been upheld with respect to other
races than the black race, and in relation to religious and other
prejudices of a serious character.' "128
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF TURNER v. MURRAY

Willie Lloyd Turner, a black man, entered a Franklin, Virginia
jewelry store on July 12, 1978 with a sawed-off shotgun. 12 9 W. Jack
Smith, Jr., the store's owner, another store employee, and two customers were present in the store when Turner entered.' 30 Smith, a
white man, set off a silent alarm as he gathered together the jewelry
and money demanded by Turner.' 3 ' The alarm signal was picked
123 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 195-203 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens began his opinion with an
attack on the majority's use of the Ristaino "special circumstances" test. Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued:
Before any citizen may be permitted to sit in judgment on his peers, some inquiry
into his potential bias is essential. Such bias can arise from two principal sources: a
special reaction to the facts of the particular case, or a special prejudice against the
individual defendant that is unrelated to the particular case. Much as we wish it
were otherwise, we should acknowledge the fact that there are many potential jurors
who harbor strong prejudices against all members of certain racial, religious, or
ethnic groups for no reason other than hostility to the group as a whole. Even when
there are no "special circumstances" connected with an alleged criminal transaction
indicating an unusual risk of racial or other group bias, a member of the Nazi Party
should not be allowed to sit in judgment on a Jewish defendant.
Id. at 196-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
125 Id. at 197-200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 197-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 199-200 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 199 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Aldicdge, 283 U.S. at 313).
129 Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. at 1684.
130 Id. at 1685 n.l.
131 Id. at 1684-85.
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up by the police, 1 32 and, when Officer Alan Bain arrived at the jewelry store to investigate, he was disarmed by Turner.1 3 3 Turner
then fired a shot towards the rear of the store and threatened to
34
shoot the store's occupants if any other police officers arrived.
Without warning, Turner shot Smith in the head after a police siren
sounded. 3 5 Turner then shot Smith in the chest twice, killing
him. 13 6 Bain subsequently disarmed Turner and placed him in
3 7
custody.
Turner was indicted on "charges of capital murder, use of a
firearm in the commission of a murder, and possession of a sawed13 8
off shotgun in the commission of a robbery."'
In preparation for the voir dire, Turner's counsel submitted several statements and questions to the trial judge, including: "The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The
victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will these facts
prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to
render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence?"' 13 9
The judge refused to ask this question, 140 choosing less precise inquiries such as: "Do any of you know any reason whatsoever why
you cannot render a fair and impartial verdict in this case, either for
the defendant or for the Commonwealth of Virginia?" 141 When the
132 Id. at 1685.
133 Id.
134 Id.

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. In response to the defense's objection to this refusal, the trial judge stated that
a question into racial prejudice such as the one requested "has been ruled on by the
Supreme Court. I'm not going to ask that." Petition for Certiorari, Joint Appendix,
Turner v. Sielaff, No. 84-6646 (1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
141 106 S. Ct. at 1695 (Powell,J., dissenting). Other questions asked by the trialjudge
were:
Are you related by blood or marriage to either of the attorneys in this case, to the
defendant or to the alleged victims, either Alan Bain or W.Jack Smith, Jr.? ... Do
you know anything about this case? . . . Are you related by blood or marriage to
any person who is employed as a police officer or any other law enforcement
agency? ... Have you or any members of your family been a victim of any crime?
...
Do you have any religious or conscientious scruples or objections against the
imposition of a sentence of death? ... Do any of you know any reason whatsoever
why you should not sit as a member of the jury in this case?
Petitioner's Reply Brief, Turner v. Sielaff, No. 84-6646 (November 25, 1985)(LEXIS,
Genfed library, Briefs file).
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or his attorney
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judge asked his questions, the prospective jurors were unaware that
Smith was white.1 42 The final jury, which consisted of eight whites
and four blacks,14 3 convicted Turner of all three charges.144
In a separate hearing, the same jury recommended the death penalty for Turner, 145 and the trial judge accepted the jury's
46

recommendation. 1

Turner appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Virginia Supreme Court, which upheld the trial court's rulings.' 4 7 The
state supreme court cited its 1977 decision in Lewis v. Commonand the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such further
inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). The two state statutes governing voir dire procedure which were
in effect during Turner's trial give substantial discretion to the trial judge. Section 8.01358 of the Code of Virginia provided:
The court and counsel for either party may examine under oath any person who is
called as a juror therein and may ask such person or juror directly any relevant
question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the
cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein; and the party objecting to any juror may introduce any competent
evidence in support of the objection; and if it shall appear to the court that the juror
does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and placed
in his stead for the trial of that case.
A juror, knowing anything relative to a fact in issue, shall disclose the same in
an open court.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (1950) (amended 1977). Former Rule 3A:20 of the Code of
Virginia, in effect at the time of Turner's trial, provided, in relevant part, the following
guidelines for the conducting of voir dire:
(a) Examination. - After the prospective jurors are sworn on the voir dire, the court
shall question them individually or collectively to determine whether anyone:
(1) Is related by blood or marriage to the accused or to a person against whom the
alleged offense was committed;
(2) Is an officer, director, agent or employee of the accused;
(3) Has any interest in the trial or the outcome of the case;
(4) Has acquired any information about the alleged offense or the accused from the
news media or other sources and, if so, whether such information would affect his
impartiality in the case;
(5) Has expressed or formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused;
(6) Has a bias or prejudice against the Commonwealth or the accused; or
(7) Has any reason to believe he might not give a fair and impartial trial to the
Commonwealth and the accused based solely on the law and the evidence.
Thereafter, the court, or counsel with permission of the court, may examine on
oath any prospective juror or may ask any question relevant to his qualifications as
an impartial juror. A party objecting to ajuror may introduce competent evidence
in support of the objection.
VA. CODE ANN. § 3A.20(a) (1972) (amended 1979).
142 Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1685.
143 Id. The foreman of the jury was black. Id. at 1695 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 1685; see supra note 138 and accompanying text for a list of the three charges
against Turner.
145 106 S. Ct. at 1685. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text for an analysis
and the language of the statutes enabling the jury to sentence Turner to death.
146 106 S. Ct. at 1685.
147 Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 531, 273 S.E.2d 36, 48 (1980).
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wealth 148 which established the rule that "[t]he mere fact that a defendant is black and that a victim is white does not constitutionally
mandate" an inquiry into the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors.149 The court also concluded that no abuse of the large
amount of discretion given to the trial judge occurred during Turner's trial.' 50 The United States Supreme Court denied the resulting petition for a writ of certiorari. 15 1
Turner filed a writ of habeas corpus on July 27, 1983 in the
15 2
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
The subsequent denial of habeas corpus relief was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit following the
district court's issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 153
The Fourth Circuit denied Turner's habeas corpus petition in
Turner v. Bass. 154 The circuit court interpreted the post-Ristaino
standard as stating that "voir dire on racial prejudice was not constitutionally mandated."' 1 5 The court rejected Turner's arguments
that Ham mandated voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice when special circumstances exist and that such circumstances existed since
148

218 Va. 31, 35-36, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1977).

149 Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. at 523, 273 S.E.2d at 42.
150 Id., 273 S.E.2d at 42. The Virginia Supreme Court stated:

With the exception of seven questions, all of which were asked in this case, Rule
3A:20(a) makes voir dire questioning entirely discretionary with the trial court. Unless the refusal to ask a question amounts to a denial of due process or otherwise
impinges upon the right to a fair and impartial jury, the present wording of Code
§ 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:20(a) empowers a trial court to use its discretion in determining whether to ask questions proposed by either the Commonwealth or the
defendant.
Id., 273 S.E.2d at 42 (citation omitted).
151 106 S. Ct. at 1693 n.l (Powell, J., dissenting). The denial of certiorari is located at
451 U.S. 1011 (1981). It is interesting to note thatJustice White failed to mention this
earlier certiorari denial in the majority and plurality opinions. In a footnote outlining
the procedural history of Turner, Justice Powell mentioned this certiorari denial in his
dissenting opinion. 106 S.Ct. at 1693 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152 Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir. 1985). This petition was amended but
still denied in May of 1984. Id. The subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment
was denied two months later. Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 354.
155 Id. at 345. The court stated further that the United States Supreme Court in Ristaino "concluded that the mere fact that the victim was white and the defendant was
black was less likely to distort the trial than were the special factors present in Ham." Id.
Furthermore, Ristaino represented a refusal by the Supreme Court "to create a per se
rule requiring voir dire on racial prejudice in any case where the defendant is of a different race from the victim." Id.
The Fourth Circuit also analyzed Rosales-Lopez as support for their decision in Turner
v. Bass that the interracial nature of a crime alone is not sufficient to mandate voir dire
inquiry into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors. Id. Instead, the trial court
should analyze the probability of whether the jurors in a specific case will be racially or
ethnically prejudiced. Id.
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the charge was capital murder. 156 Turner also contended that a defendant convicted of murdering a white person receives the death
penalty with more frequency, "and therefore a special circumstance
is created by this likelihood." 15 7 In response, the Fourth Circuit
stated:
We are of opinion that the nature of the crime or punishment itself is
not a special circumstance. Nor is the fact that the victim is white and
the defendant black, as Ristaino specifically so held. We are also of
opinion that the fact that a larger percentage of white victims' assail158
ants are executed than are other races is not a special circumstance.
159
Judge Phillips specially concurred in the court's holding.
While he expressly agreed with the result, Phillips disagreed
strongly with the majority's refusal to delineate as "special circumstances" conditions which would have enabled Turner to demand
voir dire questioning into the possible racial biases of the potential
jurors. 160 Phillips concluded that "not only specific racial issues in
the particular case but a demonstrated likelihood of racial prejudice
affecting the particular jury, irrespective of specific issues, may invoke the constitutional right"'16 1 to question prospective jurors
about their potential racial biases. 16 2 Furthermore, Phillips indicated that "scientifically sound statistical evidence related to community attitudes as reflected in jury performance in sufficient
16
samples of comparable cases" could be useful.

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

A bitterly divided Court decided Turner v. Murray. Justice
White wrote the Court's majority and plurality opinions, with which
Chief Justice Burger concurred.' t Justices Brennan and Marshall
each wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.
156

Id.

Id. See supra note 3 for references to studies directed to the high percentage of
blacks receiving the death penalty.
158 753 F.2d at 345.
159 Id. at 354-55 (Phillips, J., concurring).
160 Id. (Phillips, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 355 (Phillips, J., concurring).
162 Id. (Phillips, J., concurring).
163 Id. (Phillips, J., concurring).
164 Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, and White constituted a plurality in two
parts of the Court's opinion. Justice Brennan's vote in the remaining two parts of the
opinion gave the Court an actual majority.
157
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THE MAJORITY AND PLURALITY OPINIONS

The Court stated that it granted certiorari to analyze the Fourth
Circuit's holding that no constitutional guarantee of a voir dire inquiry into the potential racial prejudices of the prospective jurors
existed at Turner's trial 1 6 5 The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Ristaino standard: that a black defendant accused of an interracial crime is not necessarily guaranteed voir dire inquiry into the
racial prejudices of the prospective jurors. 16 6 The Court distinguished Ristaino from Turner by focusing on the fact that, unlike the
1 67
defendant in Ristaino, Turner was accused of a capital offense.
The Court also discussed the substantial amount of discretion
given to capital sentencing juries under Virginia law.' 68 By statute,
Virginia courts must comply with a three-step process prior to giv170
ing a death sentence.1 69 First, the jury must find a "probability"
that the defendant will continue to commit crimes of violence or
that the defendant's conduct in the crime at issue was "outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." 17 1 Second,
the jury must analyze all evidence offered by the defendant as possible mitigation of the crime. 172 Finally, the jury must recommend
165 106 S. Ct. at 1686.
166 Id. at 1686-87. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Ristaino v. Ross.
167 106 S. Ct. at 1687.
168 The cited statutes are from the Annotated Code of Virginia. Section 19.2-264.2
states:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court
or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that
his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind
or an aggravated battery to the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death
be imposed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1983). Section 19.2-264.4(B) states, in relevant part:
Evidence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing
admissibility, may include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history
and background of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense.
Facts in mitigation may include ... [the fact that] at the time of the commission of
the capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired....
Id. at § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983).
169 106 S. Ct. at 1687.
170 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2.
171 Id.
172 Id. at § 19..2-264.4.
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the death sentence in order for it to be imposed. 173
The Court viewed this three-step process-which appeared to
establish conditions making it more difficult to impose the death
penalty-as "a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate
but remain undetected."' 174 The first step of the process could be
affected by the fact that "a juror who believes that blacks are violence-prone or morally inferior"' 175 may too easily find the relevant
aggravating factors present in the defendant's actions. 17 6 Second, a
biased juror could be less willing to accept the mitigating evidence
offered by the defendant. 7 7 Finally, the Court acknowledged that
"[flear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts
of petitioner's crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty."1 78 The plurality qualified its impressions, however, by stating
that the Court did "not retreat from [its] holding in Ristaino. The
fact of interracial violence alone is not a special circumstance' entitling the defendant to have prospective jurors questioned about ra179
cial prejudice."'
The Court focused on the presence of two factors-its perception of potentially unbridled juror discretion and "the complete finality of the death sentence"' 8 0-to find "the risk that racial
prejudice may have infected petitioner's capital sentencing unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have been
minimized."' 18 1 As a result, the Court held that the trial judge's refusal to inquire into the potential racial biases of the prospective
jurors resulted in a failure "to adequately protect petitioner's con18 2
stitutional right to an impartial jury."'
The majority held that "a capital defendant accused of an inter173 Id. at § 19.2-264.2. But see infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text forJustice
Powell's interpretation of these statutes.
174 106 S. Ct. at 1687.
175 Id. Such prejudices could also affect the following two steps of the death sentencing process.
176 Id. These aggravating factors arise if the defendant's "conduct in committing the
offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1).
177 106 S. Ct. at 1687. See supra notes 168 & 172 and accompanying text for the
statutory basis of this requirement.
178 106 S. Ct. at 1687. See supra notes 168 & 173 and accompanying text for the
statutory basis of this requirement.
179 106 S. Ct. at 1687 n.7. See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ristaino.
180 106 S. Ct. at 1688.
181 Id. (footnote omitted). This language is very similar to that of Chief Justice
Hughes in Aldridge fifty years earlier. See supra text accompanying note 15.
182 106 S. Ct. at 1688 (footnote omitted).
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racial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the
18 3
race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias."'
The Court placed two limitations on the application of this rule.
First, the Court, embracing Ham,' 84 gave the trial judge "discretion
as to the form and number of questions on the subject, including
the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively.' t 5 Second, the Court expressly placed the burden of re1 86
questing such a voir dire inquiry on the defendant.
The Court, acting in plurality, next applied its holding to the
specific facts in Turner.18 7 Due to "[t]he inadequacy of voir dire"'18 8 at
trial, the Court vacated Turner's death sentence.' 89 This inadequate voir dire resulted in "an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice
infecting the capital sentencingproceeding."'190 In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed three elements of Turner's case:' 9 ' (1) the
interracial and violent nature of the crime in question; (2) the large
amount ofjury discretion under the Virginia death penalty statutes;
and (3) "the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing
92
in a capital case."'
The Court did not, however, vacate the jury's conviction of
Turner. 19 3 Citing Ristaino as support, the Court concluded that
"[at] the guilt phase of petitioner's trial, the jury had no greater discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been non''
capital murder. 94
183 Id.
184 409 U.S. 524.

106 S. Ct. at 1688.
Id. The Court reiterated this condition in a connected footnote, stating that
"[s]hould defendant's counsel decline to request voir dire on the subject of racial prejudice, we in no way require or suggest that the judge broach the topic sua sponte." Id. at
n.10.
187 Id. at 1688-89.
188 Id. at 1688.
185
186

189 Id.
190 Id. (emphasis in original).

Id. at 1689.
Id. The Court carefully qualified the scope of its inquiry into the third element,
noting that "[we] find it unnecessary to evaluate the statistical studies which petitioner
has introduced in support of the proposition that black defendants who kill whites are
executed with disproportionate frequency." Id. at n. 11.
'91
192

'93 Id. at 1688-89.
194 Id. at 1689. It

is important to analyze two footnotes in the Court's opinion which
seek to explain the reasoning behind the plurality's affirmation of the trial court's finding of guilt. In response to Justice Brennan's arguments in his partial concurrence, partial dissent, see infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text, Justice White wrote that
[w]e are unpersuaded by Justice Brennan's view that "the opportunity for racial
prejudice to taint the jury process is ...equally a factor at the guilt [and sentencing]
phase[s] of a bifurcated capital trial .... As we see it, the risk of racial bias at
sentencing hearings is of an entirely different order, because the decisions that sen-

1986]
B.

INQUIRING INTO JURORS' RACIAL PREJUDICES

735

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE, PARTIAL DISSENT

Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's holding that Turner's
death sentence should be vacated. 19 5 He conditioned his agreement, however, by arguing for a more inclusive standard as to when
voir dire questioning into the racial prejudices of the prospective jurors should occur.1 9 6 Justice Brennan, relying on Justice Marshall's
dissent in the 1973 Ross v. Massachusetts certiorari denial, argued that
voir dire inquiry into possible racial biases should be guaranteed
"whenever a violent interracial crime has been committed."' 9 7 In
contrast, the Turner majority held that such an inquiry is appropriate
only in a situation involving "a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime."' 9 8 Justice Brennan justified his inclusion of noncapital defendants accused of interracial crimes in stating:
The reality of race relations in this country is such that we simply may
not presume impartiality, and the risk of bias runs especially high
when members of a community serving on a jury are to be confronted
with disturbing evidence of criminal conduct that is often terrifying
and abhorrent.' 9 9
Justice Brennan argued further that the Court should vacate
tencingjurors must make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are
deciding guilt or innocence.
106 S. Ct. at n.12 (quoting id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part)).
In Part Two of the Court's opinion, the plurality responded to the dissent, noting:
NotwithstandingJustice Powell's attempt to minimize the significance of the discretion entrusted to the jury at a capital sentencing hearing .... we are convinced that
such discretion gives greater opportunity for racial prejudice to operate than is
present when the jury is restricted to factfinding. This, together with the special
seriousness with which we view the risk of racial prejudice influencing a capital sentencing decision, are what distinguish this case from Ristaino.
Id. at 1688 n.8; see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text for an analysis ofJustice
Powell's arguments to the contrary.
195 106 S. Ct. at 1689 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Accordingly, Justice Brennan stated his belief that the death sentence qualifies as cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The eighth amendment to the Constitution states that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The fourteenth
amendment, in relevant part, states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
196 106 S. Ct. at 1689 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text for an analysis ofJustice Marshall's dissent in the Ross v. Massachusetts
certiorari denial.
198 106 S. Ct. at 1688.
199 Id. at 1689 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Seesupra notes
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Turner's conviction. 20 0 Relying on the plurality's warnings of the
20 1
dangers of racially biased jurors in capital sentencing hearings,
Justice Brennan stated that "the Court never explains why these biases should be of less concern at the guilt phase than at the sentencing phase." 20 2 Justice Brennan further challenged the plurality by
stating that:
[a] racially biased juror sits with blurred vision and impaired sensibilities and is incapable of fairly making the myriad decisions that each
juror is called upon to make in the course of a trial. To put it simply,
he cannot judge because he has prejudged. This
is equally true at the
20 3
trial on guilt as at the hearing on sentencing.
C.

JUSTICE MARSHALL'S PARTIAL CONCURRENCE, PARTIAL DISSENT

Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, also concurred in
44-46 and accompanying text for an analysis of the similar language used by Justice
Marshall in his dissenting opinion in the Ross v. Massachusetts certiorari denial.
200 106 S. Ct. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan stated that "the Court disavows the logic of its
own reasoning in denying petitioner Turner a new trial on the issue of his guilt." Id. at
1690 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Furthermore, Justice Brennan argued that "the distinction between the jury's role at a guilt trial and its role at a
sentencing hearing is a distinction without substance in so far as juror bias is concerned
. " Id. (Brennan,
..
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
201 Id. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See supra notes
174-78 and accompanying text for the plurality's language.
202 106 S. Ct. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan furthered his argument by asking the plurality the following rhetorical
questions:
[M]ight not [a racially prejudiced] juror be influenced by those same prejudices in
deciding whether, for example, to credit or discredit white witnesses as opposed to
black witnesses at the guilt phase? Might not those same racial fears that would
incline a juror to favor death not also incline a juror to favor conviction? ...Does
the Court really mean to suggest that the constitutional entitlement to an impartial
jury attaches only at the sentencing phase? Does the Court really believe that racial
biases are turned on and off in the course of one criminal prosecution?
Id. at 1691-92 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The Third Circuit in United States v. Robinson also addressed the critical importance of an unbiased jury throughout the trial process. 485 F.2d 1157. The Robinson
defendant, who was black, was accused of failing to comply with the requirements of the
1967 Selective Service Act. Id. at 1158. The trial judge refused to allow defense counsel
to ask the prospective jurors whether they would give equal credibility to witnesses of
different races. Id. The Third Circuit found this refusal in error, stating:

The government contends that Aldridge and Ham are not controlling in this case
because the specific question suggested by counsel dealt with credibility of witnesses based upon their race rather than with prejudice against the defendant as
such based upon his race. Aside from the fact that the district court's reaction to the
question effectively put an end to any exploration of the area of racial prejudice, we
think any such fine distinction between prejudice against witnesses based upon race
and prejudice against the defendant based upon race would be pettifogging.
Id. at 1159.
203 106 S.Ct. at 1691 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the Court's vacating of Turner's death sentence and dissented from
20 4
the decision to affirm the jury's conviction.
In analyzing the internal conflicts of the Turner plurality's holding, Justice Marshall focused on the actual application of the Court's
decision. Specifically, he noted that post-Turner defendants accused
of interracial capital crimes will be entitled to demand voir dire questioning into the potential racial biases of the jury panel members. 20 5
If the same jury rules on conviction and sentencing, then the
probability of a racially unbiased jury throughout the entire proceeding increases.2 0 6 This guarantee of a bias-free jury was not applied in Turner, however, since the Court chose to vacate only
Turner's death sentence, 20 7 and Turner's conviction, which was decided by a possibly racially biased jury, was affirmed. 20 8 As a result,
Justice Marshall concluded that the Turner result is "incongruous
20 9
and fundamentally unfair."
D.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented in Turner
v. Murray.2 10 Justice Powell criticized the majority's decision to allow capital defendants charged with interracial crimes " 'to have
prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned
on the issue of racial bias.' "211 Justice Powell argued that such a
result was "certain to add to the already heavy burden of habeas
petitions filed by prisoners under sentence of death without affording any real protection beyond that provided by our decisions in
Ham v. South Carolina . . .and Ristaino v. Ross." 2 12 Justice Powell
further stated that Turner represented a significant departure from
2 13
Ham, Ristaino, and Rosales-Lopez.
The dissent viewed the Turner holding as creating a per se rule
204

Id. at 1693 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

205 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210 Id. at 1693-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 1693 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 1688).
212 Id. at 1693 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
213 Id. at 1697 (Powell, J., dissenting). Though little explanation is offered by Justice
Powell in regards to the Court's departure from its ruling in Ham, he wrote:
The decision today cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of Ristaino and RosalesLopez in which we expressly held that the Constitution does not require voir dire
questioning on racial bias unless the defendant proves additional circumstances beyond the fact that the case involves an interracial crime. Moreover, those two cases
rejected any constitutional presumption that jurors are racially biased.
Id. at 1697 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
206
207
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which was unacceptable in light of what Justice Powell viewed as the
minimal amount of discretion exercised by jurors in the sentencing
process. 2 14 Referring to the same state statutes which the plurality
used to highlight the large amount of juror discretion allowed in
Virginia,2 1 5 as well as another statute not mentioned in the majority
or plurality opinions,2 1 6 Justice Powell stated that such "significant
limitations on the jury's exercise of sentencing discretion illustrates
2 17
why the Court's per se rule is wholly unfounded."
Justice Powell also embraced the reasoning, though not the result, ofJustice Brennan's attack on the plurality's double standard in
21 8
vacating only Turner's death sentence and not his conviction.
Justice Powell stated that
[j]ust as there is no reason to presume racial bias on the part ofjurors
who determine the guilt of a defendant who has committed a violent
crime against a person of another race, there is no reason to constitutionalize such a presumption with respect
to the jurors who sit to rec219
ommend the penalty in a capital case.
Id. at 1693, 1695-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1696 (Powell,J., dissenting). See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text
for an explication of statutes.
216 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1982). This statute states, in relevant part: "The following offenses shall constitute capital murder, punishable as a Class I felony: ... (d)
The willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon." Id.
217 106 S. Ct. at 1696 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell analyzed the statutes as
follows:
Under Virginia law, murder is a capital offense only if it is "willful, deliberate and
premeditated" and is committed while the perpetrator is engaged in another crime
or under specified aggravating circumstances. VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (1982). As in
any criminal prosecution, of course, the State carries the burden of proving all elements of the capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a sentencing
hearing, the death sentence may not be imposed unless the State proves beyond a
reasonable doubt statutorily defined aggravating factors. Virginia law recognizes
only two aggravating factors: whether, based on the defendant's criminal record,
there is a probabiliity that he would commit future crimes of violence, and whether
the defendant's crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." VA.
CODE §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (1983). The jury also is required to consider any
relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.
...
Just as the trial judge's charge at the guilt phase instructs the jurors that
they may consider only the evidence in the case and that they must determine if the
prosecution has established each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
the charge at the penalty phase directs the jurors to focus solely on considerations
relevant to determination of appropriate punishment and to decide if the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt factors warranting imposition of
death.
Id. at 1696 (Powell, J., dissenting).
218 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text for an
analysis ofJustice Brennan's reasoning.
219 106 S. Ct. at 1696 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit expressed similar
frustration in United States v. Barnes in response to the defendant's objection to the
trial judge's refusal to allow voir dire inquiry into the prospective jurors' religions, identi214
215
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The dissentingJustices also focused on the actual trial proceedings in Turner, concluding that the potential racial biases of the prospective jurors were not at issue. 2 20 Justice Powell found two facts
significant in reaching this conclusion. First, he focused on the importance of the fact that the twelve person jury consisted of four
blacks, one of whom served as foreman. 2 2 ' Second, he emphasized
that the statistical evidence presented by defense counsel did not
contain specific data for the state of Virginia. 22 2 This data asserted
that more black defendants accused of murdering whites are sentenced to death than are non-white capital defendants. 2 23
Thus, by looking at the result of the majority's decision and disregarding its reasoning, Justice Powell concluded that "the [Turner]
rule is based on what amounts to a constitutional presumption that
'22 4
jurors in capital cases are racially biased.
V.

ANALYSIS.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Turner v. Murray
represents a severe undermining of Ristaino. The Court established
a per se rule for post-Turner capital defendants accused of interracial
crimes which guarantees voir dire examination into the racial biases
of the prospective jurors when requested. 22 5 The creation of such a
per se rule directly counters the Ristaino Court's belief that "[i]n our
heterogeneous society, policy as well as constitutional consideraties, and ethnicity. 604 F.2d 121, 133-40 (2d Cir. 1979). The Barnes defendants were

accused of narcotics violations. Id. at 130. In approving the trial court's conduct ofvoir
dire as reflecting the large amount of discretion granted trial judges, the court stated:
It is not, after all, the prospective jurors who are on trial in the cases that come
before the courts. It can be imagined that, as counsel seek more and more information to aid in filling the jury box with persons of a particular type whom they believe
to be well disposed toward their clients, prospective jurors will be less than willing
to serve if they know that inquiry into their essentially private concerns will be
pressed.
Id. at 140.
220 106 S. Ct. at 1694-97 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell summarized this view,
stating that "[t]here is nothing in the record of this trial that reflects racial overtones of
any kind." Id. at 1695 (Powell, J., dissenting).
221 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in the 1973 case of
United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973), found irrelevant the fact that the
jury which convicted a black defendant of violating a federal narcotics law consisted of
seven white jurors and five blackjurors. The court stated: "We think it equally plain that
the presence of some black jurors does not cure the errors committed during the voir
dire. For if even one member of the jury harbors racial prejudice against the accused,
his right to trial by an impartial jury is impaired." Id. at 1311.
222 106 S. Ct. at 1695 (Powell, J. dissenting).
223 Id. at 1694-95 (Powell, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 1697 (Powell, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 1688.
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tions militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that
justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin
...
226 In establishing the new rule, the Court acknowledged the
fact that racial prejudice may affect the constitutional guarantee of
an impartial jury. 22 7 The Court's limited standard, furthermore, resembles the Aldridge Court's heightened concern with protecting the
2 28
sixth amendment rights of capital defendants.
The Court, however, refused to delineate race as a "special circumstance" which unconditionally guarantees voir dire inquiry into
racial prejudice. 22 9 Such a refusal is reflected in the Court's limited
application of its per se rule to defendants accused of interracial capital offenses. No application of the espoused per se inquiry into racial
bias was mandated in cases of non-capital interracial crimes, such as
23 0
interracial rape, which has traditionally evoked such prejudice.
Furthermore, the limited holding does not encompass either intraracial capital crimes or intraracial non-capital crimes where the
racial bias of a white juror towards a black defendant could remain
unaffected regardless of the fact that the victim is black.
In addition to its very limited scope, another major downfall of
the Turner holding is its inconsistent application. All post-Turner defendants accused of interracial capital crimes are guaranteed voir dire
examination into the potential racial biases of prospective jurors if
they so request. Turner, however, did not receive this guarantee
since the Court refused to vacate his conviction. The plurality
seemingly ignored the fact that the same potentially racially biased
jury which sentenced Turner to die had also found him guilty of
capital murder. Justice White attempted to use the large amount of
statutorily granted juror discretion in the sentencing phase to argue
that racial bias was more likely in Turner's sentencing procedure
than during the conviction phase of his trial. 23 1 True racial prejudice, however, could easily withstand the smallest grant ofjuror dis226 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596 n.8 (citation omitted). The value of statistical data showing the inordinate numbers of black defendants executed each year remains unknown
after Turner, since the Supreme Court chose not to address this issue.
227 Justice White wrote that "[b]ecause of the range of discretion entrusted to ajury in

a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected." Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1687.
228 Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text for an
analysis of Aldridge.
229 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text for a comparison of the Court's use

of race as a "special circumstance" in Ham and Ristaino.
230 See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text for an analysis of Dukes v.
Waitkevich, an interracial rape case which was denied certiorari by a split Supreme
Court in 1976.
231 Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1687-88.
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cretion allowed by law, especially when such biases remain wholly
unchallenged during the voir dire. Therefore, it is direct questioning, rather than an institutional reliance on statutorily limited juror
discretion, which will produce racially unbiased juries.
The Turner Court followed the United States v. Booker rule of ignoring the racial make-up of the jury in determining whether racial
prejudice actually affected Turner's trial proceedings. 2 32 It is apparent, therefore, that the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial
jury does not include the right to have jurors from the same racial or
23 3
ethnic group as the defendant on the jury panel.

Post-Turner trial judges continue to have substantial discretion
in cases involving interracial capital crimes. The Turner Court refused to place limitations on the number of questions about racial
prejudice that the prospective jurors should be asked, the wording
of such questions, and whether such inquiries should be made on a
collective or an individual basis. 23 4 This large amount of discretion
will enable trial judges to limit dramatically the scope of voir dire
inquiry into racial prejudice in all interracial capital cases. 23 5 Since
the per se inquiry required by Turner is limited to defendants accused
of interracial capital crimes, even less protection from the trial
judge's discretion will be provided for non-capital defendants and
intraracial capital defendants.
Additionally, the Turner Court directly undermined its 1981 decision in Rosales-Lopez by altering one portion of the three-part standard announced in that case. 2 36 After Turner, a defendant must still
request voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice and must also be accused of an interracial crime to be guaranteed such inquiry. 23 7 The
defendant, however, must now be accused of a capital offense, not
just a violent crime, as required in Rosales-Lopez.238 Justice Rehn23 9
quist forecasted this distinction in his Rosales-Lopez concurrence.
See supra note 221 for an analysis of Booker.
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1764-65 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
234 106 S. Ct. at 1688.
235 A single inquiry asked by the trial judge to the prospective jurors collectively as to
whether any of them would be prejudiced in any way against a black defendant would
scarcely elicit a response from even the most overt racist. Yet, such a minimal inquiry
would be permissible in interracial capital cases after Turner.
236 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of this three-part
standard in Rosales-Lopez.
237 These conditions fulfill the first and third parts of the Rosales-Lopez standard. See
supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text for an analysis of Justice Rehnquist's opinion on this issue.
232
233
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The resulting Turner standard will effectively eliminate the right of
defendants who are accused of interracial crimes which are violent,
but not capital, to demand voir dire inquiry into the racial biases of
the prospective jurors. Furthermore, no protection from juror bias
is afforded black defendants accused of intraracial capital or intraracial non-capital offenses. Such a result will protect the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury only if it can be shown that a
white juror who would be racially prejudiced against a black defendant accused of an interracial capital offense would not also harbor a
similar bias against the same black defendant accused of an interracial non-capital offense or an intraracial capital or non-capital
offense.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The per se rule established by Turner is wholly inadequate to
guarantee an impartial jury for defendants who are not protected by
the decision's limited scope. The Supreme Court's narrow holding
implies that only defendants accused of interracial capital crimes deserve sixth amendment protection. In turn, the racial prejudices affecting the juries at the trials of defendants accused of interracial
non-capital crimes and all intraracial crimes remain unchallenged.
It cannot be effectively argued that less potential for a racially
prejudiced jury exists in crimes not covered by the Turner decision.
The Court implies, however, that the results of a trial affected by
racial prejudice will be less severe in a case other than one involving
an interracial capital crime. Yet, as ChiefJustice Hughes stated fiftyfive years prior to the Turner decision, if the jurors "were found to
be impartial, no harm would be done in permitting the question; but
if any one of them was shown to entertain a prejudice which would
preclude his rendering a fair verdict, a gross injustice would be per''
petrated in allowing him to sit. 240
The finality of the death penalty demands that heightened care
be exercised to guarantee a fair trial for capital defendants. Yet, an
established mandate is necessary to guarantee the existence of an
impartial jury for each defendant whose sixth amendment guarantee
of a fair trial will be superseded by jurors whose racial prejudices
remain unchallenged.
MARIA WYCKOFF
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Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314.

